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John Burnham is almost certainly correct in asserting that
prohibition did contribute to a decline in alcohol consumption,
particularly among lower income Americans.' Yet we must be
wary of thereby assuming that prohibition was, on balance, a
success. The most dramatic decline in alcohol consumption in
the United States occurred not during the period during which
the Eighteenth Amendment was in effect (1920-1933) but
between 1916 and 1922. The enactment of prohibition stat-
utes by many states during this period as well as the govern-
ment's closing of breweries and distilleries during the First
World War undoubtedly contributed to this decline. But it is
important to recognize that factors other than criminal laws
also played a significant, perhaps more important, role. The
temperance movement was highly active and successful during
this time in disseminating information about the dangers of
alcohol and in popularizing negative attitudes toward drinking.
The patriotic fervor aroused by the war contributed to a spirit
of self-sacrifice and alcohol temperance derived from the need
to conserve grain and "an atmosphere of hostility toward all
things German, not the least of which was beer."' 2 In short, a
great variety of factors coalesced during this brief period to
substantially reduce the extent of alcohol consumption and
alcohol-related ills.3
Further proof of the importance of factors other than pro-
hibition statutes is provided by the very evidence on which
Burnham relies. He notes that the admission rate for alcohol
psychoses to New York state hospitals declined from 10% in
1909-1912 to 1.9% in 1920.' Yet this decline occurred largely
prior to national prohibition and in a state that had not enacted
its own prohibition law. Similarly, alcoholic admissions to
Bellevue Hospital in New York City dropped from 4.99 (per
1,000 New Yorkers age 25-64) in the peak year of 1910 to 2.85
1. Burnham, New Perspectives on the Prohibition "Experiment" of the 1920s, 2
J. Soc. HIST. 51 (1968).
2. D. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 10 (1979).
3. F. ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE 1920s
(1931).
4. Burnham, supra note 1.
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in 1919, then dropped dramatically to 0.73 in 1920 and 0.81 in
1921, and then rose steadily to 2.44 in 1933.1 First admissions
for alcohol psychoses to New York State mental hospitals evi-
denced similar trends.6 Another study on which Burnham
relies indicates that the estimated rate of chronic alcoholism in
the United States dropped from 1,248 in 1910 and 1,202 in
1915 to 681 in 1920 and remained at approximately that level
throughout Prohibition. 7
At best, one can argue that national prohibition was effec-
tive during its first years, when temperance norms remained
strong and illicit sources of production had not yet been firmly
established. By almost all accounts, alcohol consumption was
higher in the middle and end of national prohibition than it was
at the beginning-despite the substantially greater resources
devoted to enforcement during the later years. The decline in
alcohol consumption between roughly 1916 and 1922,. much
like the dramatic decline in cigarette consumption in recent
years, had less to do with prohibition laws than with changing
norms and the imposition of non-criminal justice measures.
Burnham's contention that prohibition was largely inci-
dental to crime is also difficult to sustain. Between 1923 and
1933, the proportion of the U.S. population incarcerated in
federal and state prisons and reformatories increased approxi-
mately 50% (from 73 to 110 per 100,000 total population).'
By contrast, the proportion had remained constant between
1910 and 1923, the years during which alcohol consumption
declined most dramatically.9 Similarly, the proportion of the
population imprisoned in jails increased 61% between 1923
and 1933 (from 26 to 42 per 100,000 population) after appar-
ently declining significantly from 1910."0 The number and
proportion of inmates incarcerated in federal prisons for liquor
law violations increased dramatically from 12% of the 5,426
committed in 1909-14 to 43.4% of the 47,322 committed in
1929-34." Although these figures do not prove that alcohol
5. Jolliffe, The Alcoholic Admissions to Bellevue Hospital, 83 SCIENCE 306
(1936).
6. Landis & Cushman, The Relation of National Prohibition ot the Incidence of
Mental Disease, 5 Q.J. STUDIES ON ALCOHOL 527 (1945).
7. Jellinek, Recent Trends in Alcoholism and Alcohol Consumption, 8 Q. J.
STUDIES ON ALCOHOL 1 (1947).
8. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HISTORICAL
CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1984 34 (1986).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 78.
11. Id. at 153.
NADELMANN'S RESPONSE
prohibition caused higher rates of crime, they do suggest a
causal relationship.
More importantly', alcohol prohibition clearly did add a
criminal dimension to most aspects of alcohol production and
distribution. Even if most participants in the alcohol market
were never arrested, the fact remains that tens of millions of
Americans were, directly or indirectly, participants in an illicit
activity and typically perceived themselves as such. Criminal
enterprises reaped billions of dollars in revenues, paid protec-
tion money to many thousands of government officials, and
engaged in violent interactions with one another. The results
of Prohibition, Frederick Lewis Allen wrote, "were the bootleg-
ger, the speakeasy, and a spirit of deliberate revolt which in
many communities made drinking 'the thing to do'."' 2
Perhaps the most telling indictment of the U.S. experiment
with alcohol prohibition is provided by the British experience
with alcohol control during a similar period. Whereas in the
United States the death rate from cirrhosis of the liver dropped
from 13-15 per 100,000 population in 1910-1914 to 7 during
the prohibition years and then climbed back to pre-1914 levels
by the 1960s, in Britain the death rate from cirrhosis of the
liver dropped from 10 in 1914 to 5 in 1920 and then gradually
declined to a low of 2 in the 1940s before rising to a rate of 3
by 1963.'" Other indicators of alcohol abuse dropped by simi-
lar magnitudes. 4 "This remarkable achievement occurred,"
Milton Terris has written, "despite the fact that there was no
prohibition in the United Kingdom." Britain's "wartime meas-
ures included a sharp curtailment in the amount of alcohol
available for consumption, drastic restriction of the hours of
sale, and marked increases in taxes on alcoholic beverages.
With the end of the war, the limitations on the available quan-
tity of alcohol were removed, but the hours of sale were
extended to only half the pre-war time of opening, while taxa-
tion was increased even further."' 5
Britain not only reduced the negative consequences of
alcohol consumption more effectively than did the United
States, but it did so in a manner that raised substantial govern-
12. F.L. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 82.
13. Terris, Epidemiology of Cirrhosis of the Liver: National Mortality Data, 57
AM. J. Punuc HEALTH 2085 (1967).
14. Saunders, The Case for Controlling Alcohol Consumption, in THE MISUSE
OF ALCOHOL 214-31 (N. Heather, I. Robertson & P. Davies, eds. 1985); A.
SHADWELL, DRINK IN 1914-1922: A LESSON IN CONTROL (1923); H. CARTER,
THE CONTROL OF THE DRINK TRADE IN BRITAIN (1919).
15. Terris, supra note 13, at 2085.
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ment revenues; by contrast, the United States government
spent substantial revenues attempting to enforce its prohibi-
tion laws and sacrificed far greater revenues into the hands of
criminal enterprises. The British experience strongly indicates
that the national prohibition of alcohol in the United States
was, on balance, not successful. It also suggests that more
effective control measures after the repeal of prohibition might
have prevented the return to high levels of alcohol abuse.
Our conclusions with respect to the high points of both
alcohol control efforts, however, must be tempered by the rec-
ognition that they coincided with (and possibly contributed to)
dramatic increases in the consumption of another highly addic-
tive psychoactive substance. Per capita annual consumption of
small cigarettes in the United States rose from 34.68 in 1900 to
85.49 in 1910, jumped to 470.85 in 1920, doubled again to
976.91 in 1930, and continued to rise during the following
three decades.'"
Siassi's and Fozouni's conclusions regarding the lessons of
Iran's experience with an opium maintenance program are of
questionable relevance to my analysis. As they in fact note,
Iran's program was neither well conceived nor well maintained.
Once it was curtailed, "other illicit sources of supply... at once
replaced the sale from the 'legal' sources.""17 Moreover, other
countries that did not experiment with such maintenance plans
also experienced dramatic increases in opiate use; indeed, the
enactment of anti-opium laws in many Asian countries in which
opium use was traditional-including Hong Kong, Thailand,
Laos and Iran-is believed to have played a strong role in stim-
ulating the creation of domestic heroin "industries" and sub-
stantial increases in heroin use.' 8 Finally, a central criterion by
which any maintenance program should be measured is its
impact on drug users who would otherwise rely entirely on the
black market; this issue is not addressed by Siassi and Fozouni.
Nahas is correct as he contends that interdiction measures
can curtail consumption in some cases. He neglects, however,
to emphasize that the effectiveness of such measures typically
depends upon the ruthlessness of the regime and the homoge-
16. R.J. TROYER & G.E. MARKLE, CIGARETTES: THE BATTLE OVER
SMOKING 34 (1983).
17. Siassi & Fozouni, Dilemmas of Iran's Opium Maintenance Program: An
Action Research for Evaluating Goal Conflicts and Policy Changes, 15 INT'L J.
ADDICT. 1127 (1980).
18. Westermeyer, The Pro-Heroin Effects of Anti-Opium Laws in Asia, 33
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1135 (1976); Ibrahim, Iran Puts Addicts in its Labor
Camps, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1989, at 3.
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neity of the society;. The Japanese and Swedish successes in
curtailing the illicit consumption of amphetamines and heroin
owed much to the extraordinary homogeneity of their societies;
and even the account of Japan's success must be tempered by
recognition that abuse of inhalants among youth has repre-
sented a serious problem since 1967. " Singapore's success
reflects the capacity of a quasi-totalitarian regime to employ
highly repressive measures in a relatively tiny geographical
area.2° Similarly, China's opium problem was not substantially
curtailed until the communist regime implemented highly
repressive measures after 1949.
In the United States, opiate addiction was declining before
the Harrison Act was enacted;"' indeed the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906, which required only that patent medicine
manufacturers list the ingredients, reportedly reduced patent
medicine sales by a third.22 The low levels of cocaine and opi-
ate addiction in the United States and Europe between 1930
and 1960 were a consequence of many factors other than drug
prohibition. The increases in illicit drug consumption in much
of Europe and the United States thereafter did not, in most
cases, coincide with any lessening of the criminal penalties
attached to drug offenses.
The association of "legalization of use and possession of
cannabis, cocaine, and heroin in Italy and Spain... with major
epidemics of the use of these drugs" is largely spurious. On
the one hand, countries with far stiffer penalties, such as Ger-
many, Iran and Malaysia, evidence comparable or higher rates
of use and drug-related ills.2 3 On the other hand, the Nether-
lands, which does not apply criminal penalties to mere drug
possession, has lower rates of illicit drug use, new drug users,
drug overdose deaths, and drug-related AIDS cases than most
other Western European countries. Illicit drug "overdoses," it
must be stressed, are largely a consequence of the criminaliza-
tion, and hence unregulated nature, of the drug supply.
19. Suwanwela & Poshyachinda, Drug Abuse in Asia, 38(1 & 2) BULL. ON
NARCOTICS 41 (1986); Kumagai, Drug Abuse and Counter-Measures in Japan, 29
MED. J. MALAYSIA 136 (1974).
20. McGlothlin, The Singapore Heroin Control Programme, 32(1) BULL. ON
NARCOTICS 1 (1980).
21. D. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA
BEFORE 1940 (1982).
22. D. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC
CONTROL (1987).
23. Ibrahim, supra note 18, at 3; Richardson, Asians Plan Crackdown on
Drug Trade, Int'l Herald Tribune, September 22, 1989 at 5; Droge, Als Hdttest
du eine Rakete im Kopf, DER SPIEGEL, November 21, 1988, at 142-50.
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Even as the governments of Italy and Spain are now
attempting to enact tougher anti-drug measures, support for
alternatives to prohibition is growing throughout much of
Europe.24 In Italy, a Radical Party member was elected in
April 1989 to the European Parliament on a drug legalization
plank. In Germany, Mayor Henning Voscherau of Hamburg
and the former federal health minister, Rita Suessmuth, are
among those insisting that the drug laws be reexamined. 25 In
Spain, the movement to legalize drugs is attracting support
from diverse sectors of society. 2 6 In Zurich, officials have
established a legally sanctioned "free zone for drug addicts."127
In the United States, growing numbers of prominent officials
are speaking out in favor of alternatives to drug prohibition.28
These trends seem likely to continue.
24. Dickey,.A Common Market of Crack?, NEWSWEEK, September 18, 1989,
at 37.
25. Mildefirstichtige, Hdrtegegen Dealer, DER SPIEGEL, November 7, 1988
at 22-24; Voscherau, Siekb'nnen mirja ein en Kranz Schicken, DER SPIEGEL, July
17, 1989 at 27-30.
26. Pizano, El Movimiento para Legalizar la Druga Crece en Espdna, CAMBIO
16, October 2, 1989 at 12-17.
27. Cody, In a Zurich Park, Addicts Find a Haven, Int'l Herald Tribune,
August 30, 1989 at 1.
28. Shultz, Schultz on Drug Legalization, Wall St. J., October 27, 1989, at
A17; Moore, Dissenters in the Drug War, NAT'LJ., November 4, 1989, at 2692-
95; D. Lazare, N.Y. Observer, November 6, 1989, at 1.
